



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily (Cable)**

**23 December 1982**

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GUATEMALA: Counterinsurgency Campaign

*//Counterinsurgency operations are continuing as the government prepares to put new civic action programs into effect.//* [redacted]

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[redacted] President Rios Montt and Defense Minister Mejia believe the insurgency will be eradicated during the coming year. The government claims that more than 800 guerrillas were killed since March, but its forces suffered losses of 680 men during the same period.// [redacted]

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*//The Army contends it has reestablished control in the Western Highlands, although small pockets of resistance remain. [redacted] military leaders are still concerned over increasing guerrilla activity in Peten Department and combined operations by insurgent groups in Chimaltenango.//* [redacted]

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*//Military operations are continuing along the border with Mexico. [redacted]*

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*//Rios Montt, meanwhile, has announced the second phase of the government's national reconstruction program. The plan, which includes increased housing, employment, and social programs, will focus on areas most affected by the insurgency.//* [redacted]

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Comment: *//Although the military has reestablished control over much of the Western Highlands, the insurgency is not likely to be eliminated in 1983. As the guerrillas regroup, they will continue to use hit-and-run tactics against the Army.//* [redacted]

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*//The announcement of the new aid plan probably will strengthen Rios Montt's public standing temporarily, but the plan's effectiveness may depend on assistance from international organizations. The program also is likely to be hampered in its early stages by the government's limited transportation capabilities.//* [redacted]

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ISRAEL-EGYPT: Public Recriminations

*Israel and Egypt have intensified public attacks on one another with more formal charges and countercharges of violations and nonimplementation of the peace treaty.* [ ]

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//Bilateral relations were severely strained by Israeli actions in Lebanon and the subsequent recall of Egypt's Ambassador to Tel Aviv. The Israelis, in a recent memorandum circulated in the US, accused the Egyptians of condoning anti-Israel comments in the press, freezing diplomatic and consular relations, and not fully carrying out trade agreements. According to the US Embassy in Cairo, Egypt plans to reply with a list of Israeli treaty violations.// [ ]

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Comment: //Although Israel recognizes that its invasion of Lebanon has caused regional problems for Egypt, Tel Aviv rejects linking the normalization process with the situation in Lebanon. Israeli officials argue that relations with Egypt should not be affected by either inter-Arab or Arab-Israeli developments. They fear that Egypt will eventually go back on its treaty obligations in order to reenter the Arab mainstream.// [ ]

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//Egypt maintains that its relationship with Israel should not be treated as a special case. In Cairo's view, Tel Aviv's recent actions were contrary to the spirit of the peace treaty and cannot be ignored.// [ ]

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//Egypt and Israel are looking to the US to use its influence with the other to get the relationship back on track. The current spate of mutual recriminations threatens, however, to sour relations further.// [ ]

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USSR-BULGARIA: Possible Soviet Displeasure

The US Embassy in Moscow reports that an apparent slight in Soviet press coverage of the meeting this week between General Secretary Andropov and President Zhivkov may reflect displeasure with the Bulgarian leader. *Pravda* stated that an atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality" and "full unity of views" prevailed during the meeting. At the sametime, it failed to highlight either leader's name or to claim "full mutual understanding," as was done with the party chiefs from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The diminished coverage may be further evidence of Moscow's reported unhappiness with what it views as an emerging trend toward nationalism in Bulgaria. Andropov's sensitivity to Western press speculation that he was involved with the alleged Bulgarian plot to assassinate the Pope also may have led him to play down his personal contact with Zhivkov. In the West, however, Moscow will continue its firm denials of any Bulgarian complicity. [REDACTED]

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KENYA: Fuel Shortages

A fire this week at Kenya's major oil depot, which resulted in a loss of \$4 million worth of gasoline, will accelerate the country's economic decline. The fire also destroyed electrical equipment for the national pipeline, requiring shipments of petroleum products to Kenya and neighboring countries to be transported by truck or train. According to press reports, President Moi claims that sabotage could be involved. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The fire and the shutdown of the pipeline will cause severe gasoline shortages over the holiday period. Even before the incident, Nairobi and most other cities were suffering from shortages of diesel fuel and kerosene. The security forces probably can contain any disorders. Moi may try to deflect criticism by blaming Uganda and Tanzania for the fire, and he is likely to ask the US for emergency help to restore the depot and pipeline. [REDACTED]

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WEST GERMANY - US - FRANCE: Helicopter Procurement

[redacted] West Germany is interested in procuring the Bell Cobra AH-1 as its next-generation antitank helicopter. Previous plans to develop an anti-tank helicopter with the French have languished because of disagreement over the principal mission of the aircraft.// [redacted]

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Comment: Selection of the Cobra is consistent with earlier reporting that Chancellor Kohl hopes to strike a balance between US and West European countries on coproduction. Continued progress on the Bell proposal may incline the West Germans to choose US over West European firms for the future production of a tactical fighter and a surface-to-air missile system. Bonn probably will not make a public statement on the helicopter project soon to avoid damaging relations with Paris in the early months of the government under Chancellor Kohl. [redacted]

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## Special Analysis

### SURINAME: Threats to Bouterse's Rule

*Army commander Bouterse has strengthened his control of the country as a result of the executions of his most prominent critics, but he faces several potential challenges to his authority. Beneath the surface calm, there is widespread public revulsion against his use of brutal measures. Bouterse's perception of threats to his life and position will be a key factor in any decision to seek security assistance from Cuba. Havana, however, probably would be reluctant to become involved in Suriname on a large scale.*

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//The executions probably reflected Bouterse's fear that a recurrence of strikes would intensify the opposition to him.

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This coterie of Army sergeants--known as the "Group of 16"--apparently assisted in the executions. It is divided, however, by ideological differences.

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//The killings also raise the possibility of retaliation by relatives or friends of the victims.

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Without a strong leader, the disgruntled members of the military will be reluctant to oppose Bouterse. They probably will adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Further provocative actions by Bouterse or a deterioration in the economic situation could revive open opposition.

The cutoff of aid from the Netherlands, which has provided almost all of Suriname's foreign assistance, will force Paramaribo into a difficult search for alternative sources. Without a quick infusion of funds, spending cuts in the bloated public-sector employment rolls would be likely. To augment its revenues, the government could place additional levies on businesses.

//The regime also could nationalize Dutch assets. Such a move, however, would lead to the withdrawal of other foreign investment and to the further emigration of skilled labor.//

#### The Cuban Role

Suriname and Cuba established diplomatic relations in 1979. Bouterse initially was cool to Cuban efforts to forge closer ties, but relations gradually warmed after December 1980. Following an abortive coup attempt in March 1982, open and clandestine dealings among Bouterse, various pro-Cuban Surinamese, and the Cubans accelerated.

//There is no indication of direct Cuban involvement in the executions. Bouterse probably had no plans to deal with the consequences of his actions, however, and thus turned quickly to Havana for advice and support.

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To provide protection against retaliation, Bouterse probably asked for some Cuban intelligence and security advisers. His concern about creating divisions among members of his clique--some of whom are strong anti-Communists--would be likely to preclude a request for a larger Cuban presence at this time. [REDACTED]

#### Havana's Future Role

Nevertheless, if Bouterse's life is threatened or his political dominance is challenged he might look to Havana for more help. A 100-man Cuban contingent probably would be enough to consolidate Bouterse's position and forestall most threats to his continued rule--short of a major revolt by the armed forces. [REDACTED]

As they have done elsewhere, the Cubans could offer intelligence or security units to help Bouterse monitor the activities of potential opponents. They also could assign teams of military advisers to the Surinamese armed forces. Such advisers could assist Bouterse in forming a loyal military organization. [REDACTED]

In addition, a team of Cuban bodyguards and security personnel could be provided to Bouterse and other key members of his regime. Cuba also could send more military supplies and ammunition to Suriname, possibly from stocks in Grenada. [REDACTED]

Even so, Havana probably would avoid any large-scale involvement in Suriname. The Castro regime would be wary of becoming bogged down in a prolonged struggle. [REDACTED]

A highly visible intervention, moreover, would have strong negative repercussions in Brazil, Venezuela, and elsewhere in Latin America--thereby endangering Havana's recent diplomatic gains in the region. In addition, Moscow probably is already uncertain about Bouterse's long-term prospects and would be uneasy about a sizable Cuban troop presence in a region where the Soviets are striving to improve ties. [REDACTED]

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